

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418

February 12, 1990

TO: Yuri Shiyon
FROM: Lynn Rusten *LR*
SUBJECT: Next BW Meeting

I spoke with Dr. Lederberg this morning about our plans for the next BW working groups' meeting in the US. As you know, we are working to arrange a site visit to the Swiftwater facility of the Salk Institute where vaccines are produced for the US BW defense research program. We hope to invite the Soviet delegation for a meeting probably in late June or July, but are not yet able to suggest specific dates. We hope to make a concrete proposal sometime in April.

Regarding the agenda, we expect to continue discussions on many of the items discussed at our last meeting in Moscow. In fact, we are still waiting for: 1) Dr. Abarenkov's thoughts on BW-related export controls; and 2) additional thoughts your side has on the problem of how to categorize and where to set quantitative limits on potential BW agents to specify allowed or forbidden levels of research and development. As you recall, your side promised to send these items to us by FAX. We do appreciate your sending us Dr. Prozorovskiy's remarks on mutual information and Dr. Rayevskiy's comments on Dr. Shelokov's paper about inspections.

In addition to continuing our discussion of these items, we would like to further discuss the issue of civilian scientific surveillance of the military medical programs in each country. We would also like to discuss in greater depth the problem of whether it is possible to design export controls which would help inhibit proliferation of BW agents and associated technology without unduly impeding legitimate scientific and even commercial activities.

These are just some very preliminary thoughts on the agenda. We welcome your suggestions also. We hope to be in touch after a month or so to invite you for specific dates and elaborate our ideas for the agenda. In the meantime, I would appreciate it if you could tell me the FAX number for Dr. Ivanov's institute. If Dr. Ivanov is eager to pursue these matters, I am sure Dr. Lederberg would be pleased to hear from him directly.

Senator Herb Kohl


August 10, 1989

-2-

realistic cases that could be envisaged, including individual homicide, terrorism, and military acts in violation of the BWC. Terrorist acts could after all be directed at individuals or small numbers of individuals, not necessarily acts of "mass destruction". There are many other loose ends in the Convention but I urge you not to try to address them in legislation: they are already troublesome in international discussion, like the definition of "toxins". These are better coordinated with chemical weapons and their control.

As to the seizure and destruction of dangerous material, that ought to be embraced under existing law as (a) material evidence (b) environmental safety and (c) interstate transport and export of dangerous material.

Yours sincerely,



Joshua Lederberg